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Abstract: - Our society’s critical infrastructures are sociotechnical cyber-physical systems (CPS) increasingly 
using open networks for operation. The vulnerabilities of the software deployed in the new control system 
infrastructure will expose the control system to many potential risks and threats from attackers. This paper starts 
to develop an information systems design theory for resilient software-intensive systems (DT4RS) so that 
communities developing and operating different security technologies can share knowledge and best practices 
using a common frame of reference. By a sound design theory, the outputs of these communities will combine to 
create more resilient systems, with fewer vulnerabilities and an improved stakeholder sense of security and 
welfare. The main element of DT4RS is a multi-layered reference architecture of the human, software (cyber) 
and platform (physical) layers of a cyber-physical system. The layered architecture can facilitate the 
understanding of the cross-layer interactions between the layers. Cyber security properties are leveraged to help 
analyzing the interactions between these layers. 
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1 Introduction 
The human body is inherently resilient in its ability 
to persevere through infections or trauma, but our 
society’s critical infrastructures, such as 
communication, energy, water, transportation, 
finance and healthcare systems, lack the same degree 
of resilience, typically losing essential functionality 
following adverse events [1]. Resilient systems are 
able to minimize the negative impacts of adverse 
events on societies and sustain or even improve their 
functionality by adapting to and learning from 
fundamental changes caused by those events [1]. 
Identifying the need for system resilience requires 
defining the system. Our society’s critical 
infrastructures are sociotechnical cyber-physical 
systems (CPS) and they are increasingly using open 
networks for operation. Revolutionary advances in 
hardware, networking, information and human 
interface technologies require new ways of thinking 
about how CPS are conceptualized, built, evaluated 
[2] and controlled.  
The classical design of control systems includes a 
multitude of control design methods such as robust 
control, adaptive control, and stochastic control. The 
classical design takes into account modelling 
uncertainties as well as physical disturbances. With 
the increasing integration of control systems with 
new information technologies, modern control 
systems face uncertainties also from the Cyber World 
[3]. The vulnerabilities of the software deployed in 
the new control system infrastructure will expose the 
control system to many potential risks and threats 
from attackers, see [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11] 
and [12].  
Our research goal is to develop an information 
systems design theory for resilient software-intensive 
systems (DT4RS) so that communities developing 
and operating different security technologies can 
share knowledge and best practices using a common 
frame of reference. By a sound design theory, the 
outputs of these communities will combine to create 
more resilient systems, with fewer vulnerabilities and 
an improved stakeholder sense of security and 
welfare. 
The structure of the remainder of the paper: 
Section 2 gives a literature review with regard to 
sociotechnical cyber-physical systems (CPS) and 
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their cyber security issues. Section 3 presents the 
“methodology” of this paper; design theory 
development. Section 4 describes the proposed 
elements of the design theory for resilient systems. 
Section 5 discusses about the usefulness of the 
solution and concludes the paper. 
 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Sociotechnical Cyber-Physical Systems 
Figure 1 presents the domain of sociotechnical cyber-
physical systems. Past sociotechnical systems were 
physical systems, including only the human layer and 
the platform layer, as shown in figure 2a. Current 
sociotechnical systems are software-intensive 
systems (SIS) [2] as shown in figure 2b. SIS’ future 
trend is that the software layer (=cyber part) is 
growing, as illustrated in figure 2c. All SIS are also 
cyber-physical systems (CPS) where the human and 
platform layers form the physical part and the 
software layer forms the cyber part of the cyber-
physical system [13]. 
When individual CPS (e.g. autonomous vehicles) 
communicate independently in a larger system (the 
traffic system) and interact with other systems 
(people, other vehicles, sensors in roads, GPS 
systems, traffic lights), a system of systems is 
automatically created. According to Jamshidi [14], 
systems of systems (SoS) means “a SoS is an 
integration of a finite number of constituent systems 
which are independent and operable, and which are 
networked together for a period of time to achieve a 
certain higher goal.” In a system of CPS, the 
individual system communicates not only with its 
own components, but also with technical and social 
systems in its environment. 
 
 
2.2 Cyber Attacks to CPS 
The last few years have seen the publication of 
numerous research papers that analyze cyber 
vulnerabilities in CPS, see [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], 
[10], [11] and [12]. Figure 3 identifies the control 
loop components that can be impacted by cyber 
attacks, including measurements, actuator signals, 
controllers and reference signals [15]. Han et al. [15] 
introduce a framework for understanding cyber 
attacks and the related risks to CPS that consists of 
two elements, a three-layered (Physical layer, 
Control layer, and Cyber layer) logical model and 
reference architecture for CPS, and a meta-model of 
CPS attacks that is referred to as the CPS kill-chain. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Cyber-physical system attacks 
 
Zhu and Basar [3] introduce a cross-layer 
approach for designing resilient control systems for 
CPS. Their approach integrates physical control 
systems with cyberinfrastructure and divides the 
cyber-physical control system into six layers: 
 
 
Fig. 1 Variety of sociotechnical cyber-physical 
system [13] 
 
 
Fig. 2 Software-intensive system trends [2] 
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physical, control, communication, network, 
supervisory, and management, as shown in figure 4. 
To manage the increasing complexity of CPS, it is 
essential that control designs exploit the hierarchical 
nature of such systems [3], [16].  
 
 
3 Design Theory Development 
Designing security for software-intensive systems is 
challenging since the technologies that make up these 
systems, e.g., operating systems, databases, 
networks, and the world-wide web, have traditionally 
used different models for security. Furthermore, the 
communities that develop these technologies do not 
systematically learn from each other’s best practices 
in designing for security [17]. 
In the operating system community, the necessity 
to distinguish the level of privilege required to run 
code from that required to read a file or access other 
resources is well-known. Also, before any code is run 
on a system, the originator of the code should be 
authenticated and authorized or acknowledged as 
trusted by the user [17]. These design principles and 
security mechanisms have been expressed more than 
three decades ago. On the other hand, the database 
development and operations communities still allow 
Structured Query Language injection attacks to cause 
significant damage to businesses and consumers 
(e.g., reputation damage, financial loss, identity theft, 
etc.) by not properly observing these design 
principles. The development, networking, and 
operations communities have made similar mistakes. 
Examples are routing advertisements as parameters 
to code that modify critical shared resources – routing 
tables on the Internet – service providers have 
frequently allowed information that is transported 
over the Internet to be misrouted and delivered to a 
hacker’s network or machine. However, all informed 
security communities understand that security 
benefits from following an appropriate design 
process in the context of a system lifecycle [17]. 
Gregor and Jones [18] define six core components 
of design theory and two additional components that 
are shown in Table I. Next sections of this paper 
propose our design theory for resilient software-
intensive systems with regard to the six core 
components. 
 
 
4 Proposed Elements of Design Theory 
for Resilient Systems 
 
4.1 The Purpose and Scope 
The main purpose for designing resilient systems is 
how to return privacy and trust in digital world and 
to gain a global competitive edge in security-related 
business, such as critical infrastructures. The 
purpose, with regard to security, is to know what is 
going on and what will happen in the network(s), and 
to be aware of the current level of security in the 
 
 
Fig. 4  Hierarchical structure of cyber-physical control systems  [3] 
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network(s), how to design or build-in security and 
resilience to a networked environment, and to define 
trade-offs for security and privacy levels versus 
system’s usability. The overall aim is to mitigate 
cyber security risks, which in its turn supports the 
business continuity and operations of the whole 
society. 
 
 
4.2 Constructs 
 
4.2.1 Resilient Systems 
Resilience means that a system or infrastructure is 
able to adapt to changing conditions. In the case of 
information security, resilience is based on 
integrating two parallel subtasks: (1) run-time 
situation awareness and (2) a priori risk analysis. On 
the other hand, resilience itself is a twofold topic: (1) 
the system has to be robust against attacks, i.e., the 
attack is prevented in its first phase, and (2) the 
system has to be able to return to a safe state after the 
attack. Healing requires that utilized data and system 
operation can be restored as soon as possible. 
Therefore, healing processes have to be trained and 
tested. 
 
 
4.2.2 Situational Awareness 
Situational Awareness involves being aware of what 
is happening around one to understand how 
information, events, and one’s own actions affect the 
goals and objectives, both now and in the near future.  
The most important enablers of situational 
awareness are observations, analysis, visualization, 
and cyber-policy of the government.  
 
Table I. Eight components of an Information System Design Theory 
 
Component Description 
Core components 
Purpose and scope (the 
causa finalis) 
“What the system is for,” the set of meta-requirements or goals that specifies the 
type of artifact to which the theory applies and in conjunction also defines the 
scope, or boundaries, of the theory. 
Constructs (the causa 
materialis) Representations of the entities of interest in the theory. 
Principle of form and 
function  
(the causa formalis) 
The abstract “blueprint” or architecture that describes an IS artifact, either 
product or method/intervention. 
Artifact mutability The changes in state of the artifact anticipated in the theory, that is, what degree of artifact change is encompassed by the theory. 
Testable propositions Truth statements about the design theory. 
Justificatory knowledge The underlying knowledge or theory from the natural or social or design sciences that gives a basis and explanation for the design (kernel theories). 
Additional components 
Principles of 
implementation  
(the causa efficiens) 
A description of processes for implementing the theory (either product or 
method) in specific contexts. 
Expository instantion A physical implementation of the artifact that can assist in representing the theory both as an expository device and for purposes of testing. 
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4.2.3 Security Technology 
Security technologies include all technical means 
towards cyber security, such as secure system 
architectures, protocols and implementation, as well 
as tools and platforms for secure system development 
and deployment. 
 
4.2.4 Security Management and Governance 
Security management and governance covers the 
human and organizational aspects of information 
security. Its focus areas include: (1) Security policy 
development and implementation, and (2) 
Information security investment, incentives, and 
trade-offs. Information security management system 
(ISMS) means continuously managing and operating 
system by documented and systematic establishment 
of the procedures and process to achieve 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
organization’s information assets that do preserve 
[19]. 
 
 
4.3 Principles of Form and Function 
Trustworthy and secure technologies and platforms 
are a basis to build on. As the security risks continue 
to increase with cybercrime and other unauthorized 
access, the security solutions and management of IT 
security need systematic design and constant 
development. Figure 5 shows the new systematic 
approaches towards resilient software-intensive 
systems. Both the resilient system and the situation 
awareness system are SISs. Security technologies are 
applied in and between their platform and software 
layers. Trust management is the main tool in and 
between human layers. 
Software-intensive systems consist of three 
layers: the platform layer, the software layer and the 
human layer. Every cyber-secure system consists of 
two SISs: the proper resilient system, and the 
situational awareness system that is the main 
prerequisite towards cyber security. A complex SIS 
is a system of software-intensive sub-systems, which 
platform layers compose a physical network, 
software layers compose a software network and 
human layers compose a social network, as shown in 
figure 6. Cyber security should be systematically 
built up at all layers and networks. The resilient 
physical network (composed by blue arrows in figure 
4) is the basis on which the information sharing 
between different stakeholders could be created via 
software layers (green arrows). However, the trust 
inside social networks (red arrows) quantifies the 
pieces of information that will be shared, - and with 
whom. 
The design principles towards trust-building 
includes: 
1. Proactive – design for security. A proactive 
model of information security that is driven by 
knowledge of vulnerabilities, threats, assets, potential 
attack impacts, the motives and targets of potential 
adversaries. 
2. Self-healing – utilizing the toolbox. Novel and 
effective tools and methods to cope with challenges 
of dynamic risk landscape with self-healing. 
3. Public awareness – increase trust. Enable 
seamless cyber security integration to every-day life. 
By efficiently utilizing tools and methods, 
stakeholders can co-operate while protecting their 
privacy, they can create more sophisticated security 
policies, media publicity can move from threats to 
opportunities and public awareness and 
understanding will move towards accepting cyber 
security as a natural element of a connected world. 
 
 
 
Fig.5 Systematic approach towards resilient 
software-intensive systems 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6 Software-intensive system of systems 
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3.4 Artifact Mutability 
From every indication, the growth of the software 
layer, in size and percentage of the overall systems, 
will be the future trend [2]. The role of software will 
become dominant in nearly all complex systems. 
Thus, research and development in SIS must actively 
address the challenges of using software as the 
primary building material in future complex systems 
[2]. According to Hevner and Chatterjee [2], in the 
future world of pervasive computing and ubiquitous 
cyber-physical devices, it will be essential that IT 
artifacts and the integrated systems containing these 
artifacts be reliable, adaptable, and sustainable. 
Design for SIS should draw its foundations from 
multiple research disciplines and paradigms in order 
to effectively address a wide range of system 
challenges. According to Hevner and Chatterjee [2], 
the most important intellectual drivers of future 
science of design in SIS research will be dealing with 
complexity, composition and control. Hanseth and 
Lyytinen [20] adopt the viewpoint of designers: how 
to ‘cultivate’ an installed base and promote its 
dynamic growth by proposing design rules for 
information infrastructure (II) bootstrapping and 
adaptive growth. Within their design rules, the II 
designers would have to prefer continuous, local 
innovation to increase chaos and to apply simple 
designs and crude abstractions. According to Hanseth 
and Lyytinen [20], this change is not likely, as design 
communities are often locked into institutional 
patterns that reinforce design styles assuming vertical 
control and complete specifications. 
 
 
3.5 Testable propositions  
This section present the truth statements of DT4RS.  
  
3.5.1 Situational Awareness: Prerequisite of 
Cyber Security  
The overall target of cyber security is that all systems 
and infrastructures are resilient. Situation Awareness 
is the main prerequisite towards cyber security. 
Without situation awareness, it is impossible to 
systematically prevent, identify, and protect the 
system from the cyber incidents and if, for example, 
a cyber-attack happens, to recover from the attack. 
Situation awareness involves being aware of what is 
happening around your system to understand how 
information, events, and how your own actions affect 
the goals and objectives, both now and in the near 
future. It also enables to select effective and efficient 
countermeasures, and thus, to protect the system 
from varying threats and attacks.  
Situational awareness is needed for creating a 
sound basis for the development and utilization of 
countermeasures (controls), where resiliency 
focuses. For the related decision-making, relevant 
information collected from different sources of the 
cyber environment or cyberspace, e.g., networks, risk 
trends, and operational parameters, are needed. This 
requires information exchange between different 
stakeholders. And always, when dealing with 
information exchange, the main question is “trust”.  
 
3.5.2 Security Technologies: Tools of Cyber 
Security 
Security technologies include all technical means 
towards cyber security, such as secure system 
architectures, protocols and implementation, as well 
as tools and platforms for secure system development 
and deployment. Security technologies are needed 
for fulfilling the recognized security requirements, 
and for building resilient infrastructures and systems 
with dependable hardware and software that can also 
meet future security challenges.  
Security technologies enable technical protection 
of infrastructures, platforms, devices, services, and 
data. The technical protection starts with secure user 
identification and authorization that are necessary 
features in most secure infrastructures, platforms, 
devices and services. Fortunately, well-known 
technologies exist for their implementation. 
Typically, processes and data objects are associated 
with an owner, represented in the computer system 
by a user account, who sets the access rights for 
others. A global trend is to increase the use of cloud 
service technology when providing critical services. 
Data go into a cloud and will not come back to end-
users’ devices. Also, government data has already 
gone to a cloud, and in the future more and more 
government data will migrate to cloud servers and 
services. Partnerships between cloud service 
providers and security solution providers are 
becoming more common. We will see the emergence 
of cloud service-specific-solution providers as well. 
Identity management and encryption will be the most 
important cloud security services to be offered. These 
services will be eventually offered for small to 
medium-sized businesses as well. We will also see 
emergence of cloud security standards. Challenges 
are that quite often cloud service providers believe 
that security is just an end user issue and firewall 
means security. Therefore, currently, we do not have 
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proper cloud security standards and we lack 
awareness of a true understanding of comprehensive 
cloud security.  
Security technologies are needed also then if 
something has happened. For example, forensics can 
lead to the sources of the attack/mistake and provide 
information for legal and other ramifications of the 
issue. Forensics also facilitates the analysis of the 
causes of the incident, which in turn, makes it 
possible to learn and avoid similar attacks in the 
future. 
 
3.5.3 Security Management and Governance: The 
“Brain” of Cyber Security 
The well-known fact of live is that people are the 
rock-bottom of cyber security. Security management 
and governance, “the brain and Intelligence of cyber 
security” takes care the human and organizational 
aspects of cyber security.  
Security policy is currently the main element used 
to communicate secure work practices to employees 
and ICT stakeholders. It is a declaration of the 
significance of security in the business of the 
organization in question. Additionally, the security 
policy defines the organization’s policies and 
practices for personnel collaboration. However, 
people still often fail to comply with security 
policies, exposing the organization to various risks. 
One challenge is to promote methods and techniques 
that can support the development of comprehensible 
security policies in the emerging ICT paradigms, e.g., 
cloud computing and multiple devices. Developing 
of policies that can defeat the main reasons driving 
non-compliance, such as a habit, is challenging.  
ISMS provides controls to protect organizations’ 
most fundamental asset, information. Many 
organizations apply audits and certification for their 
ISMS to convince their stakeholders that security of 
organization is properly managed and meets 
regulatory security requirements [21]. An 
information security audit is an audit on the level of 
information security in an organization. Security 
aware customers may require ISMS certification 
before business relationship is established. 
Unfortunately, ISMS standards are not perfect and 
they possess potential problems. Usually guidelines 
are developed using generic or universal models that 
may not be applicable for all organizations. 
Guidelines based to common, traditional practices 
take into consideration differences of the 
organizations and organization specific security 
requirements [22]. 
3.6 Justified Knowledge  
The approach proposed is derived from the science 
and design theories of resilient cyber-physical 
systems [1], [3], information infrastructures [20], 
cyber trust/trust building [23], and complex software-
intensive systems presented [2].  
 
 
4 Discussion and Conclusions 
The choice properties and design aspects described in 
this study are a proposed start to a design theory for 
resilient (sociotechnical, cyber-physical, software-
intensive systems of) systems (DT4RS). The main 
element of DT4RS is a multi-layered reference 
architecture of the human, software (cyber) and 
platform (physical) layers of a cyber-physical 
system. The layered architecture can facilitate the 
understanding of the cross-layer interactions between 
the layers. Cyber security properties are leveraged to 
help analyzing the interactions between these layers. 
Cyber security should be systematically built up 
at all layers and networks. The resilient physical 
network is the basis on which the information sharing 
between different stakeholders could be created via 
software (cyber) layers. However, the trust inside 
social networks quantifies the pieces of information 
that will be shared, - and with whom. 
By a sound DT4RS, the outputs of these 
communities will combine to create more resilient 
systems, with fewer vulnerabilities and an improved 
stakeholder sense of security and welfare. The next 
future work towards a complete DT4RS is to cover 
the additional components of information system 
design theory presented in Table I. 
 
 
References 
[1]  I. Linkov, T. Bridges, F. Creutzig, J. Decker, C. 
Fox-Lent, W. Kröger, J. H. Lambert, A. 
Levermann, B. Montreuil, J. Nathwani, R. Nyer, 
O. Renn, B. Scharte, A. Scheffler, M. Schreurs 
and T. Thiel-Clemen, “Changing the resilience 
paradigm,” Nature Climat Change, vol. 4, pp. 
407-409, 2014.  
[2]  A. Hevner and S. Chatterjee, Design Science 
Research in Information Systems, Springer, 
2010.  
[3]  Q. Zhu and T. Basar, “Game-Theoretic Methods 
for Robustness, Security, and Resilience of 
Cyberphysical Control Systems: Games-in-
Games Principle for Optimal Cross-Layer 
J. Rajamäki
International Journal of Communications 
http://www.iaras.org/iaras/journals/ijoc
ISSN: 2367-8887 143 Volume 1, 2016
Resilient Control Systems,” IEEE Control 
Systems, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 46-65, 2015.  
[4]  R. McMillan, “Siemens: Stuxnet worm hit 
industrial systems,” Sept. 2010. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/print/
9185419. [Accessed 18 March 2016]. 
[5]  S. Greengard, “The new face of war,” Commun. 
ACM, vol. 53, no. 12, pp. 20-22, 2010.  
[6]  B. Krebs, “Cyber incident blamed for nuclear 
power plant shutdown,” Washington Post, June 
2008. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/05/AR2008060501
958.html. [Accessed 18 March 2016]. 
[7]  S. Gorman, “Electricity grid in U.S. penetrated 
by spies,” Wall Str. J., April 2009. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204
099085.html. [Accessed 18 March 2016]. 
[8]  A. Cardenas, S. Amin and S. Sastry, “Secure 
control: Towards survivable cyber-physical 
systems,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth 
International Conference on Distributed 
Computing Systems Workshops, 2008.  
[9]  Y. Liu, P. Ning and M. Reiter, “ False data 
injection attacks against state estimation in 
electric power grids,” in Proceedings of the 
Sixteenth ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security, 2009.  
[10]  C. Li, A. Raghunathan and N. Jha, “Hijacking 
an insulin pump: Security attacks and defenses 
for a diabetes therapy system,” in Proceedings 
of the Thirteenth IEEE International Conference 
on e-Health Networking Applications and 
Services, 2011.  
[11]  J. Radcliffe, “Hacking medical devices for fun 
and insulin: Breaking the human SCADA 
system,” in The Black Hat Technical Security 
Conference USA, 2011.  
[12]  D. Shepard, J. Bhattiand and T. Humphreys, 
“Dronehack: Spoofing attack demonstration on 
a civilian unmanned aerial vehicle,” GPS World, 
1 August 2012.  
[13]  J. Rajamäki, “Towards a Design Theory for 
Resilient (Sociotechnical, Cyber-Physical, 
Software-intensive and Systems of) Systems,” 
in Recent Advances in Information Science, 
Barcelona, 2016.  
[14]  Jamshidi, M., Systems of Systems Engineering: 
principle and applications, CRC Press, 2009.  
[15]  A. Hahn, R. Thomas, I. Lozano and A. 
Cardenas, “A multi-layered and kill-chain based 
security analysis framework for cyber-physical 
systems,” Internal Journal of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, vol. 11, pp. 39-50, 
2015.  
[16]  M. Ilic, “From hierarchical to open access 
electric power systems,” Proc. IEEE, vol. 95, 
no. 5, pp. 1060-1084, 2007.  
[17]  L. Waguespack, D. Yates and W. Schiano, 
“Towards a Design Theory for Trustworthy 
Information Systems,” 47th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences 
(HICSS), pp. 3707-3716, 2014.  
[18]  S. Gregor and D. Jones, “The anatomy of a 
design theory,” Journal of the Association for 
Information Systems, vol. 8, pp. 312-335, 2007.  
[19]  W. Lee and S. Jang, “A study on information 
security management system model for small 
and medium enterprises,” Recent Advances in E-
Activities, Information Security and Privacy, pp. 
84-87, 2009.  
[20]  O. Hanseth and K. Lyytinen, “Design theory for 
dynamic complexity in information 
infrastructures: the case of building internet,” 
Journal of Information Technology, vol. 25, pp. 
1-19, 2010.  
[21]  J. S. Broderick, “ISMS, security standards and 
security regulations,” Information Security 
Technical Report, vol. 11, pp. 26-31, 2006.  
[22]  M. Siponen and R. Willison, “Information 
security management standards: Problems and 
solutions,” Information & Management, vol. 46, 
pp. 267-270, 2009.  
[23]  J. Rajamäki and R. Pirinen, “Critical 
infrastructure protection: Towards a design 
theory for resilient software-intensive syst,” 
European Intelligence and Security Informatics 
Conference (EISIC), 2015
 
J. Rajamäki
International Journal of Communications 
http://www.iaras.org/iaras/journals/ijoc
ISSN: 2367-8887 144 Volume 1, 2016
